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Abstract. Protocols for problems like Byzantine agreement, clock synchroniza-
tion or contract signing often use digital signatures as the only cryptographic
operation. Proofs of such protocols are frequently based on an idealizing “black-
box” model of signatures. We show that the standard cryptographic security def-
inition for digital signatures is not sufficient to ensure that such proofs are still
valid if the idealized signatures are implemented with real, provably secure sig-
natures.
We propose a definition of signature security suitable for general reactive, asyn-
chronous environments, called reactively secure signature schemes, and prove
that for signature schemes where signing just depends on a counter as state the
standard security definition implies our definition.
We further propose an idealization of digital signatures which can be used in a
reactive and composable fashion, and we show that reactively secure signature
schemes constitute a secure implementation of our idealization.
1 Introduction
Protocols for problems like Byzantine agreement, clock synchronization or con-
tract signing often use digital signatures as the only cryptographic operation.
Proofs of such protocols typically use a “black-box” model of signatures: they
just assume that signatures are unforgeable, i.e., they abstract from all crypto-
graphic details like asymptotic security and error probabilities. Still one should
expect that protocols proven secure in this abstract model are also secure if im-
plemented with a real, cryptographically secure signature scheme.
Unfortunately this is not true: Consider an arbitrary signature scheme Sig
that satisfies the standard GMR-definition of secure signature schemes [40]: A
signature scheme is secure if no polynomial-time (in k, a security parameter)
adversary can produce a forged signature with not negligible probability. The
adversary has exclusive access to a signature oracle, and any signature under
⋆ Parts of this work have been published at the 6th and 7th Information Security Conference
(ISC) [15, 18].
a message for which the oracle was not queried counts as a forgery. We now
transform the scheme Sig into a new scheme Sig strange which, when signing a
message m, attaches to the signature on m all previously signed messages and
their signatures. This is certainly a strange scheme, but it is easy to see that it
is secure under the GMR-definition provided the original scheme Sig is secure,
since if the adversary asks for the i-th signature, it has seen all signatures up
to the (i − 1)-st anyway; thus our new scheme is not easier to break than the
original one.
Now consider a trivial protocol for fair contract signing: We have two po-
tentially malicious parties A, B and a trusted third party T . Both main parties
have inputs c, the contract, and binary values dX , for X = A,B, which tell
them whether they should sign (dX = 1) or reject (dX = 0) the contract. The
contract should be signed only if each honest party X starts with dX = 1. The
protocol roughly works like this: Both A and B sign c, yielding signatures sA
and sB. If dA = 0 then A stops, and otherwise it sends sA to T , and similarly
B. If T receives both signatures it sends (sA, sB) back to A and B, and the
contract is considered signed. If T does not receive both signatures (which in
an asynchronous network might mean that T non-deterministically decides to
terminate) then T stops and the contract is not signed, which means that nobody
should get hold of the pair (sA, sB). Intuitively this protocol is secure, and one
can even prove this in the black-box model. But clearly if the protocol is exe-
cuted multiple times with our new signature scheme Sigstrange then from each
successful run one can construct valid contracts for all previous runs, even for
those that did not produce a valid contract.
In Section 2 we introduce a general security definition of digital signature
schemes that resolves these problems and can be used in general asynchronous,
reactive environments. The term “reactive” means that the system interacts with
its users multiple times, e.g., in many concurrent protocol runs. In Sections 3 and
4 we show that for certain signature schemes security under the GMR-definition
implies security under this definition. As our example has shown, this cannot be
true in general; thus we limit ourselves to schemes where signing needs just a
counter as state. This is sufficient for many provably secure signature schemes.
For instance, in [40] the signer computes a tree and associates each signature
with one of the leaves in this tree. Thus it is sufficient for the signing machine
to keep track of which leaves are already used, and this can easily be encoded
as a counter. Similar arguments apply, e.g., to the schemes in [57, 31, 32, 35].
In Section 5 we propose an idealization of digital signatures that can be used
in the aforementioned black-box way, i.e., which, at a low level of abstraction,
offers the functionality of a signature scheme in a reactive and composable fash-
ion. More precisely, we show that reactively secure signature schemes constitute
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a secure implementation of our idealization. By “low level” we mean that the
interface of the idealization is not yet abstract in the sense needed for current
automatic tools but still contains signatures as real cryptographic objects. This
is in contrast to, e.g., Dolev-Yao-style models [34], where cryptographic objects
are represented symbolically without being evaluated to bitstrings. For encryp-
tion, such low-level ideal functionalities were introduced in [43]. For signatures,
formalizing and proving an ideal version is actually easier because their security
property is an integrity property. It was known since [52, 53] that such proper-
ties can be formulated abstractly, e.g., in temporal logic. A similar formulation
for authentication is known from [58], but without cryptographic proofs with re-
spect to it. In essence, a low-level ideal system for signatures combines the real
signature functionality with a system-internal verification whether the desired
integrity property is still fulfilled. Such an idealization was first made in [44]
for symmetric authentication. A somewhat similar ideal signature system was
presented in [26], with variations in [29, 30]. In contrast to our abstraction, the
precise approach taken in [26] cannot be used to construct nested abstract terms
without revealing all signatures contained in these terms even if the signatures
are appropriately encrypted, i.e., while an abstract term E(pke, S(pks,m)), de-
noting the encryption of a signature of a message m, in reality keeps m secret
from the adversary even if sent over an insecure connection, its mere construc-
tion by an honest participant would give m to the adversary if one used the ideal
functionality for signing from [26]. This aspect was not changed in [29, 30, 27].
In Section 6, we finally describe several variants of our idealization such
as memory-less signature schemes and schemes restricted to fixed-length mes-
sages.
Further Related Work. Problems in reactive environments have already been
identified for other cryptographic primitives, e.g., oblivious transfer [22] and
public-key encryption [23].1 For signatures, already the standard definition from
[40] is in a reactive setting, but signatures are delivered to the adversary in the
same order as they are generated. In a general asynchronous setting these orders
may be different, which greatly complicates security proofs. In [56] signatures
are used in an encrypted way within secure channels, but the specific usage
avoids the general problems. Moreover, our work is closely related to the cur-
rently highly active line of research on computational soundness, see e.g., [1,
16, 9, 14, 20, 2, 10, 51, 12, 11, 4].
1 More generally, achieving security under system composition is widely known to be difficult
to achieve in general, see e.g., [46, 42, 47–49, 45, 33, 3, 17, 5, 18, 10].
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2 Definitions and Notation
2.1 Notation
Let Σ denote a finite alphabet, and let Σ+ denote the set of non-empty strings
over Σ. We write “:=” for deterministic and “←” for probabilistic assignment,
and “ R←” for uniform random choice from a set. ↓ is a distinguished error el-
ement available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and
algorithms. A function g : N→ R≥0 is called negligible iff for all positive poly-
nomials Q, ∃k0∀k ≥ k0 : g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k).
The fundamental data structures in our definitions and proofs are arrays that
store tuples of strings. For each array D, the tuples have a predefined structure,
e.g., each tuple stores a message with a signature. To elegantly capture the se-
lection of tuple elements, we adopt some database notation: Elements of a tuple
are called attributes , e.g., we could have two attributes msg and sig denoting
the message and the signature element of each tuple. For a tuple x ∈ D, the
value of its attribute att is written x.att . If the values of one distinguished at-
tribute att are unique among all tuples in D, i.e., the attribute gives a one-to-one
correspondence to the tuples in the array, we call att a primary key attribute. We
use this to select elements of a tuple, i.e., if a primary key attribute att exists
in D and att2 is another attribute in D, and D is clear from the context, we
simply write att2[a] instead of x.att2 , where x denotes the unique tuple with
x.att = a. If no such tuple exists, we define att2[a] := ↓.
2.2 Non-Reactive Definitions
Signature schemes often have memory. As explained in the introduction, sig-
nature schemes that divulge the history of the messages signed earlier are not
suited for use in a general asynchronous reactive environment. In the following
definition, we therefore do not allow a signature scheme to use arbitrary memory
for signing a message, but we model its memory by a counter.
Definition 1 (Counter-based Signature Schemes). A counter-based signature
scheme is a triple (gen, sign, test) of polynomial-time algorithms, where gen
and sign are probabilistic. The algorithm gen takes an input (1k, 1s) with k, s ∈
N, where s denotes the desired maximum number of signatures and k a security
parameter, and outputs a pair (sk , pk) of a secret signing key and a public test
key in Σ+. The algorithm sign takes such a secret key, a counter c ∈ {1, . . . , s},
and a message m ∈ Σ+ as inputs and produces a signature in Σ+. We write
this sig ← signsk ,c(m). Similarly, we write verification as b := testpk (m, sig)
with b ∈ {true, false}. If the result is true, we say that the signature is valid
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for m. For a correctly generated key pair, a correctly generated signature for a
message m must always be valid for m.
When we speak about a signature scheme in the following, we always mean
a counter-based signature scheme in the sense of Definition 1.
Security of a signature scheme is defined against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks (CMA-security). The definition corresponds
to the GMR-definition [40] restricted to counter-based signature schemes.
Definition 2 (CMA-security for Counter-based Signature Schemes). Given
a signature scheme (gen, sign, test) and a polynomial s ∈ N[x], the GMR sig-
nature oracle Sigs, or short signature oracle, is defined as follows: It has vari-
ables sk , pk and a counter c initialized with 0, and the following transition
rules:
– First generate a key pair (sk , pk) ← gen(1k, 1s(k)) and output pk .
– On input (sign,m) with m ∈ Σ+, and if c < s(k), set c := c+1 and return
sig ← signsk ,c(m).
The signature scheme is called CMA-secure if for every polynomial s and every
probabilistic polynomial-time machine Asig that interacts with Sigs and finally
outputs two values m and sig (meant as a forged signature for the message
m), the probability is negligible (in k) that testpk (m, sig) = true and m is not
among the messages previously signed by the signature oracle.
We further state a variant of Definition 2, which we call skipping security.
It is slightly stronger than the original definition by allowing the adversary to
choose the counter value, but only in a strictly monotonic increasing sequence,
i.e., he can only skip counter values. This variant is useful in later proofs.
Definition 3 (Skipping Security). Given a signature scheme (gen, sign, test)
and a polynomial s ∈ N[x], the skipping signature oracle SkipSigs is defined
as follows: It has variables sk , pk and a counter c initialized with 0, and the
following transition rules:
– First generate a key pair (sk , pk) ← gen(1k, 1s(k)) and output pk .
– On input (sign,m, c∗) with m ∈ Σ+, and if c < c∗ ≤ s(k), set c := c∗ and
return sig ← signsk ,c∗(m).
The signature scheme is called skipping secure if for every polynomial s and ev-
ery probabilistic polynomial-time machine Askipsig that interacts with SkipSigs
and finally outputs two values m and sig (meant as a forged signature for the
message m), the probability is negligible (in k) that testpk (m, sig) = true and
m is not among the messages previously signed by the signature oracle.
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Lemma 1 (Skipping Signatures). A signature scheme Sig is CMA-secure if
and only if it is skipping secure. This holds with essentially unchanged concrete
security, except that a CMA adversary may need up to s(k) oracle calls even if
the skipping adversary uses less.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is clear as an adversary Askipsig may ask for a
signature for every counter value, i.e., CMA-security is a special case of skip-
ping security.
For the opposite direction, assume that an adversary Askipsig successfully
attacks the skipping signature oracle SkipSigs with not negligible probability.
We then construct an adversary Asig against the signature oracle Sigs as follows.
It uses Askipsig as a blackbox submachine (also called oracle). Asig first selects
a message m∗ R← Σk. Whenever the adversary Askipsig outputs a command
(sign,m, c∗) with c < c∗ ≤ s(k) for the current counter value c of Sigs, then
Asig inputs (sign,m∗) to Sigs for c∗ − c − 1 times, thus bringing the counter
of Sigs to the value c∗ − 1. Then Asig inputs (sign,m) to Sigs and forwards the
response sig to Askipsig. It is easy to see that Asig together with Sigs correctly
simulates the skipping signature oracle SkipSigs because Sigs computes sig as
sig ← signsk ,c∗(m) just as SkipSigs would. Hence the adversary Askipsig outputs
a successful forgery (m′, sig ′) with its usual, not negligible probability in this
scenario. This is also a valid forgery for Asig unless m′ = m∗. However, no
information about m∗ in the Shannon sense leaks to Askipsig; hence this only
happens with exponentially small probability. Hence the success probability of
Asig is still not negligible. As to concrete security, the success probability is even
almost unchanged. The oracle calls by Asig are bounded by s(k), and its runtime
is typically dominated by that of Askipsig.
2.3 A New Reactive Definition
To obtain a security definition that is sufficient in a reactive environment, we
have to extend the capabilities of the adversary when interacting with the signa-
ture oracle. More precisely, we still have to allow for signing arbitrary messages,
but the obtained signatures are stored within the signature oracle and only out-
put upon request of the adversary. Now a signature is considered a forgery for
a message m if the signature is valid for m and if no signature for this message
has been revealed. This is captured in the following definition.
Definition 4 (Reactive Signature Security). Given a signature scheme (gen,
sign, test) and a polynomial s ∈ N[x], the reactive signature oracle RSigs is
defined as follows: It contains variables sk , pk , a counter c initialized with 0,
an initially empty set C of counter values, and an initially empty array SIGS
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with attributes c, m, and sig for storing tuples of counter values, messages, and
signatures. The counter c can be used as a primary key attribute; this is clear
by inspection of the transitions below. The transition rules of RSigs are:
– First generate a key pair (sk , pk) ← gen(1k, 1s(k)) and output pk .
– On input (sign,m) with m ∈ Σ+, and if c < s(k), set c := c+1 and sig ←
signsk ,c(m), and store (c,m, sig) in SIGS .
– On input (reveal, i), and if i ≤ c, set C := C ∪ {i} and return sig [i].
The signature scheme is called reactively secure if for every polynomial s and
every probabilistic polynomial-time machine Arsig that interacts with RSigs and
finally outputs two values m and sig (meant as a forged signature for m), the
probability that testpk (m, sig) = true and m 6= m[i] for all i ∈ C is negligible
(in k).
We first treat a simple but common case where the definitions are equivalent
with essentially the same concrete security.
Lemma 2 (Memory-less Schemes). Let Sig denote a memory-less signature
scheme, i.e., the function sign does not even depend on a counter. Then Sig is
CMA-secure if and only if it is reactively secure. This holds with essentially
unchanged concrete security.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is clear (or see the proof of Theorem 1). If
an adversary Arsig breaks Sig in the reactive scenario of Definition 4, we can
easily construct an adversary Asig that has the same success probability against
the same signature scheme in the non-reactive scenario of Definition 2: Asig
simply defers each signature request of the original adversary (which it uses as
a blackbox submachine), i.e., each input (sign,m), until Arsig first requests the
corresponding signature. As signing is memory-less, making the signatures in
the wrong order makes no difference. Thus Asig together with Sigs simulates
RSigs correctly. Moreover, every forged signature by Arsig is also a suitable
forgery for Asig. Moreover, for the concrete security, Asig uses at most as many
oracle calls than Arsig and its runtime is dominated by that of Arsig.
3 Reduction Proof for Unchanged Signature Schemes
In this section, we show that a counter-based, CMA-secure signature scheme is
already reactively secure. Hence signature schemes that only maintain a counter
as their local state can safely be used in an asynchronous reactive environment
without having to bother about the problem sketched in the introduction. As a
drawback, however, we will see that the concrete security gets worse.
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Theorem 1 (Reactive Security of Unchanged Signature Schemes). A
counter-based signature scheme Sig is reactively secure if and only if it is CMA-
secure. In the concrete security, we essentially lose a factor of s, the maximum
number of signatures, in the adversary’s success probability when proving re-
active security from CMA security.
Proof. The proof of the left-to-right direction is straightforward, since a reac-
tively secure system is in particular secure for an adversary requesting all signed
messages immediately when they have been made.
We now prove the opposite direction. From Lemma 1 we know that Sig is
skipping secure. Hence we only need to show that if there exists a successful
adversary Arsig against reactive security, there also exists a successful adversary
Askipsig against skipping security, i.e., against the oracle SkipSigs. The adversary
Askipsig uses the adversary Arsig as a blackbox; we call the rest of it the simulator
Sim. This is shown in Figure 1.
Definition of the simulator. Like RSigs, the simulator Sim maintains a counter
c initialized with 0 and an initially empty array SIGS with attributes c, m, and
sig for storing tuples of counter values, messages, and signatures, where c is
used as a primary key attribute. Additionally, it chooses a counter value c∗ R←
{0, . . . , s(k)} where it will cheat. Intuitively, c∗ is a guess whether Arsig will
forge a signature on a totally new message (c∗ = 0) or on a signed message
whose signature was not revealed; here c∗ denotes the corresponding counter
value. Cheating means that the simulator does not input the c∗-th sign query
from Arsig to the machine SkipSigs. If the message m∗ from this query is ever
signed again later, the simulator skips it again. If c∗ = 0, then Sim does not cheat
at all. This is important, since an adversary Arsig that requests all signatures
would otherwise always catch our simulator cheating. The variable m∗ ∈ Σ+
is initialized with ↓. The transitions of Sim are sketched in Figure 1 and defined
as follows:
– First, upon receiving a public key pk from SkipSigs, choose c∗
R←
{0, 1, . . . , s(k)} and output pk to Arsig.
– On input (sign,m) from Arsig with m ∈ Σ+: If c < s(k), set c := c + 1,
otherwise abort, i.e., stop the current transition without further action. We
distinguish two cases:
• (No cheating): If c < c∗ or (c > c∗ ∧m 6= m∗), output (sign,m, c) to
SkipSigs and obtain a signature sig . Store (c,m, sig) in SIGS .
• (Cheating): If c = c∗ or (c > c∗ ∧m = m∗), set m∗ := m and store
(c,m∗, ↓) in SIGS .
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Fig. 1. Overview of the reduction proof for unchanged signature schemes.
– On input (reveal, i) from Arsig: If i > c abort. If sig := sig [i] = ↓, give up
the simulation. (Arsig has requested a signature that the simulator skipped.)
Otherwise output sig to Arsig.
– On input (m′, sig ′) from Arsig, i.e., a supposed forgery: Output (m′, sig ′).
Proof of correct simulation for correct guess. In the original attack of Arsig
against the reactive signature oracle RSigs, let the random variable q over
{0, . . . , s(k), not valid} denote the index of the first sign query that contained
the forgery message m′, with q = 0 if m′ never occurred in a sign query, and
q = not valid if the forgery that Arsig outputs is not valid. We show that the
simulation is perfect in the case c∗ = q. More precisely, m′ and q are functions
of the pair r = (rA, skr ) of the randomness rA for Arsig and the randomness skr
for the signature system, containing the secret key and randomness for signing
for each counter value c. We show that if the same r is used in the simulated
scenario and if c∗ = q := q(r), then Arsig obtains the same view in the simu-
lated scenario. In particular, m′ is thus also the forgery message in that scenario
and q the index of the first sign query for m′.
For c∗ = 0 perfect simulation is clear since the simulator never cheats and
uses the skipping oracle to sign all messages in the correct order.
Now let c∗ ∈ {1, . . . , s(k)}. Here the proof is in principle an induction
over the interaction length. Before the c∗-th sign query the simulation is again
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clearly perfect. Thus the c∗-th sign query contains the message m′ (for the first
time), and hence m∗ = m′. Sign queries for messages m 6= m′ are simulated
perfectly also after the c∗-th sign query, in particular because Sim increments the
counter c correctly in all sign queries until it reaches s(k) and never modifies it
elsewhere; this also implies that SkipSigs returns a signature for all calls by Sim.
For sign queries for message m′, the new tuple in SIGS is wrong, but neither
Sim nor RSigs make an output and thus the view of Arsig is unchanged. Now we
consider a query (reveal, i). If i > c for the current value of c, then Sim outputs
nothing, and so would RSigs. Otherwise, we know that m[i] 6= m′ because so
far Arsig acts as in the scenario with RSigs, and there (m′, sig ′) is a valid reactive
forgery (because q 6= not valid), and a reveal query for the same message would
have made it invalid. This implies sig [i] 6= ↓, and thus Sim does not give up the
simulation. Furthermore, sig [i] was thus stored during one of the sign queries
that were simulated perfectly, and hence the output of this reveal query is also
correct. Altogether this shows that at least for c∗ = q the simulation results in
the correct view of Arsig.
Moreover, the signature sig ′ is a valid forgery for m′ also against SkipSigs
in the case c∗ = q since by construction Sim never asks SkipSigs to sign m′.
Success probability. By the definition of the random variable q, the probability
that Arsig successfully attacks RSigs is
PArsig(k) =
s(k)∑
i=0
Pr[q = i].
The simulator Sim chooses c∗ uniformly from {0, . . . , s(k)} and independently
of the randomness r that determines q. We also showed above that Askipsig is
always successful for c∗ = q. Hence for its success probability PAskipsig we obtain
PAskipsig(k) ≥ Pr[c
∗ = q] =
s(k)∑
i=0
Pr[c∗ = i ∧ q = i]
=
s(k)∑
i=0
Pr[c∗ = i] · Pr[q = i] =
1
s(k) + 1
PArsig(k).
Since PArsig(k) is not negligible by assumption and s is a polynomial, the suc-
cess probability of Askipsig is not negligible. However, we lost a factor of about
s(k)−1 in the error probability for concrete security. Otherwise the concrete se-
curity is good: Askipsig uses at most as many oracle calls as Arsig and its runtime
is typically dominated by that of Arsig. Furthermore, Lemma 1 essentially re-
tained the success probabilities and runtime, and we easily see that over both
proofs the adversary Asig does not make more oracle calls than Arsig.
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4 Stronger Reactively Secure Signature Schemes by
Randomization
In this section, we use additional randomization to transform a counter-based
CMA-secure signature scheme into a reactively secure scheme with almost the
same concrete security. We assume that an efficient encoding of tuples into Σ+
is given.
Definition 5 (Message Randomization of Signature Schemes). Let Sig =
(gen, sign, test) be a signature scheme. Then we define the corresponding
message-randomized signature scheme Sig∗ = (gen, sign∗, test∗) as fol-
lows: Let sign∗sk,c(m) := (r, signsk,c((m, r))) for r R← {0, 1}k , and
test∗pk(m, sig
∗) := testpk((m, r), sig) if sig∗ is of the form (r, sig), and false
otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Security of Message Randomization). Let Sig be a CMA-
secure signature scheme. Then the corresponding message-randomized signa-
ture scheme Sig∗ is reactively secure with essentially the same concrete secu-
rity.
Proof. We show that if there exists a successful adversary A∗rsig against the sig-
nature scheme Sig∗ in a reactive scenario, there also exists a successful adver-
sary Asig against the scheme Sig in the CMA scenario, i.e., against the corre-
sponding oracle Sigs. The adversary Asig uses A∗rsig as a blackbox, and we call
the rest of it the simulator Sim; see Figure 2. Let Sig = (gen, sign, test) and
Sig∗ = (gen, sign∗, test∗).
Definition of the Simulator. The simulator Sim maintains a counter c initialized
with 0, an initially empty set C of counter values corresponding to revealed
signatures, and an initially empty array SIGS with attributes c, m, r, and sig
for storing tuples of a counter values, messages, random values, and signatures,
where c is used as the primary key attribute. The transitions of Sim are sketched
in Figure 2 and defined as follows:
– First, upon receiving a public key pk from Sigs, output pk to A∗rsig.
– On input (sign,m) from A∗rsig with m ∈ Σ+: If c < s(k), set c := c+1 and
r R← {0, 1}k and output (sign, (m, r)) to Sigs and obtain a signature sig .
Store (c,m, r, sig) in SIGS .
– On input (reveal, i) from A∗rsig: If SIGS [i] = ↓ abort. Otherwise let
(i,m, r, sig) := SIGS [i], set C := C ∪ {i} and output (r, sig) to A∗rsig.
– On input (m, sig∗) from A∗rsig where sig∗ = (r, sig), i.e., sig∗ is supposed
to be a forgery for m: Output ((m, r), sig), i.e., sig should be a forgery for
(m, r).
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Fig. 2. Overview of the reduction proof for randomized signature schemes.
Correct Simulation and Successful Forgeries. It is easy to see that Sim together
with Sigs perfectly simulates RSig∗s , the reactive signature oracle for Sig∗. The
sets C are always equal in the two scenarios.
Now assume that A∗rsig’s output (m, sig∗) is a valid forgery. We want to
show that Asig’s output ((m, r), sig) is also a valid forgery except in a cer-
tain rare case. The precondition means that m 6= m[c] for all c ∈ C and
test∗pk(m, sig
∗) = true. Hence sig∗ is a pair (r, sig) and testpk((m, r), sig) =
true. Thus Asig makes an output, and the output is at least a valid signature.
Hence Asig’s output is indeed a successful forgery if the message (m, r) has
never been signed by Sigs, i.e., if no tuple (c,m, r, sig) with the given m and r
exists in SIGS of Sim.
If a tuple (c,m, r, sig) occurs in SIGS , then c 6∈ C because of the precon-
dition m 6= m[c] for all c ∈ C. Intuitively this means that A∗rsig has guessed the
unknown random value r correctly. The inputs (r[i], sig [i]) that A∗rsig obtained
do not depend on r[c] because the random values are chosen independently and
the signatures of a counter-based signature scheme only depend on the current
counter and input, and the random value r[c] does not influence this counter.
Success Probability. Due to the perfect simulation, A∗rsig outputs a successful
forgery in the simulated scenario with the same probability PA∗
rsig
(k) as in in-
teraction with RSig∗s. For each such output, we have just shown that the output
of Asig is also a successful forgery unless one of the at most s(k) unrevealed,
independent random values r[c] equals the value r in A∗rsig’s output. Hence Asig
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has almost the same success probability
PAsig(k) = (1−
s(k)
2k
)PA∗
rsig
(k).
It also makes the same number of oracle queries as A∗rsig, and its runtime is
typically dominated by that of A∗rsig because the runtime of Sim is essentially
given by generating s(k) random values and making s(k) lookups in a sorted
array of length s(k).
5 A Low-level Ideal Signature System and its Realization
In this section, we present an ideal system which, at a low level of abstraction,
offers the functionality of a secure signature scheme in a reactive and compos-
able fashion. Essentially, it stores which keys belong to honest users and which
messages the users signed with these keys, and it never accepts signatures that
are supposedly made with one of these keys on different messages, i.e., forg-
eries. We then show that a canonical realization is as secure as this low-level
ideal system in the sense of reactive simulatability.
5.1 The Low-level Ideal System
The ideal system is represented by one centralized machine with the overall
functionality, while the realization consists of one machine per participant. Its
honest users are, without loss of generality, numbered {1, ..., n}. We distinguish
the in- and outputs from and to different users by making them at so-called ports
insig,u? and outsig,u ! for u ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Definition 6 (Low-level Ideal Signature Machine). Let a signature scheme
Sig = (gen, sign, test) and parameters n ∈ N and s ∈ N[x] be given. Then
we define the corresponding low-level ideal signature machine Siglow id,n,s. It
maintains two initially empty arrays, KEYS with attributes user , sk , pk , and c
for the user who “owns” the key pair, the secret and public key, and the current
counter for this key, and SIGNED with attributes pk and m for a public key and
a message. The transitions are defined as follows. Let u be the index of the port
insig,u? where the current input occurs; the resulting output goes to outsig,u !.
– On input (generate): Set (sk , pk ) ← gen(1k, 1s(k)), store (u, sk , pk , 0) in
KEYS , and output pk .
– On input (sign, pk ,m): Retrieve a tuple (u, sk , pk , c) ∈ KEYS with the
given u and pk . If none or more than one exists or if c = s(k), output the
error symbol ↓. Else set c := c + 1 in this tuple in KEYS . Then set sig ←
signsk ,c(m), store (pk ,m) in SIGNED , and output sig .
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– On input (test, pk ,m, sig): Retrieve a tuple (v, sk , pk , c) ∈ KEYS with
the given pk . If none or more than one exists, output testpk (m, sig). Else if
(pk ,m) ∈ SIGNED , output testpk (m, sig), else false.
Other inputs are ignored.
The low-level ideal machine never outputs secret keys. For signing, user u in-
puts the public key to designate the desired private key, and the machine verifies
that the key tuple belongs to u. The test function is a normal signature test for
unknown public keys (typically keys generated by the adversary). For known
public keys, the low-level ideal machine first verifies that the message was in-
deed signed with this key, and then it additionally verifies that the signature
presented is valid.
The main difference to the signature functionality in [26] is that the adver-
sary learns nothing about what honest users sign. The low-level ideal machine
further formally depends on the given signature scheme Sig , like the first sim-
ilar low-level idealizations in [44]. This could be alleviated by the technique
from [28] of letting the adversary choose the algorithms, so that the overall low-
level ideal functionality comprises all possible instantiations. However, in all
use cases known to us it is not necessary: One can either assume given algo-
rithms because the low-level idealization is only used to prove a larger system,
or a really abstract idealization fits better because arguing about the evaluation
of an arbitrary algorithm input by an adversary is far beyond the kind of theo-
ries implemented in current automated proof tools. In particular, cryptographic
objects that would be output by such arbitrary algorithms can be addressed by
handles (names, pointers) in such an abstraction, as in [14].
5.2 Cryptographic Realization
The cryptographic realization of the low-level ideal signature functionality is
the natural use of digital signatures in a distributed system, i.e., it consists of a
separate machine Sigu for each user u, and each machine signs and tests in the
normal way. Together, these machines offer the same ports and accept the same
inputs as the ideal machine.
Definition 7 (Real Low-level Signature Machines). Let a signature scheme
Sig = (gen, sign, test) and parameters u ∈ N and s ∈ N[x] be given. Then we
define the corresponding low-level real signature machine Sigu,s for user u. It
has ports insig,u? and outsig,u ! and maintains an initially empty array KEYSu
with attributes sk , pk , and c for a secret and public key and the current counter
for this key pair. The transitions are defined as follows.
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– On input (generate): Set (sk , pk) ← gen(1k, 1s(k)), store (sk , pk , 0) in
KEYSu, and output pk .
– On input (sign, pk ,m): Retrieve a tuple (sk , pk , c) ∈ KEYSu with the
given pk . If none or more than one exist or if c = s(k), return ↓. Else
set c := c+ 1 in this tuple in KEYSu and output sig ← signsk ,c(m).
– On input (test, pk ,m, sig), output testpk (m, sig).
Other inputs are ignored. We denote the set of these machines for n users by
Sigreal,n,s := {Sigu,s|u ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
We claim that this real system is as secure as the low-level ideal system in the
sense of reactive simulatability.
5.3 Reactive Simulatability
The notion of reactive simulatability captures the idea of refinement that pre-
serves not only integrity properties, but also confidentiality properties. Intu-
itively it can be stated as follows, when applied to the relation between a real
and an ideal system. Everything that can happen to users of the real system in
the presence of arbitrary adversaries can also happen to the same users with
the ideal system, where attack capabilities are usually much more restricted. In
particular, this comprises confidentiality because the notion of what happens to
users not only includes their in- and outputs to the system, but also their com-
munication with the adversary. This includes whether the adversary can guess
secrets of the users or partial information about them.
The formal definition of reactive simulatability relies on the framework of
secure reactive systems in asynchronous networks by Backes, Pfitzmann, and
Waidner [56]. We give a brief overview of those parts of the framework that are
necessary to state the definition of reactive simulatability.
A system consists of several possible structures. A structure consists of a set
Mˆ of connected machines and a subset S of the free ports that the honest users
connect to. A machine is a probabilistic IO automaton (extended finite-state ma-
chine) in a slightly refined model to allow complexity considerations. For these
machines Turing-machine realizations are defined, and the complexity of those
is tyically measured in terms of a common security parameter k, given as the
initial work-tape content of every machine. Each structure is complemented to a
configuration by an arbitrary user machine H and adversary machine A, where
H connects only to ports in S and A to the rest, and they may interact. The set
of configurations of a system Sys is called Conf(Sys). The general scheduling
model in [56] gives each connection c (from an output port c! to an input port
c?) a buffer, and the machine with the corresponding clock port c⊳! can schedule
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Fig. 3. Simulatability: The two views of H must be indistinguishable.
a message there when it makes a transition. In real asynchronous cryptographic
systems, network connections are typically scheduled by A. A configuration is
a runnable system, i.e., for each k one gets a well-defined probability space of
runs. The view of a machine in a run is the restriction to all in- and outputs
this machine sees and its internal states. Formally, the view viewconf (M) of a
machine M in a configuration conf is a family of random variables with one
element for each security parameter value k.
Now reactive simulatability for a real system Sys real and an ideal system
Sys id is captured as follows [56]: For every structure (Mˆ1,S ) ∈ Sys real, every
polynomial-time user H, and every polynomial-time adversary A1, there exists
a polynomial-time adversary A2 on a corresponding ideal structure (Mˆ2,S ) ∈
Sys id such that the view of H is computationally indistinguishable in the two
configurations. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Indistinguishability is a well-
known cryptographic notion from [60].
Definition 8 (Computational Indistinguishability). Two families (vark)k∈N
and (var′k)k∈N of random variables on common domains Dk are computation-
ally indistinguishable (“≈”) iff for every algorithm Dis (the distinguisher) that
is probabilistic polynomial-time in its first input,
|P (Dis(1k, vark) = 1)− P (Dis(1
k, var′k) = 1)| ∈ NEGL,
where NEGL denotes the set of all negligible functions.
Intuitively, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to
either vark or var′k, Dis tries to guess which distribution the element came from.
Definition 9 (Reactive Simulatability). For two systems Sys real and Sys id,
one says Sys real ≥ Sys id (at least as secure as) iff for every polynomial-time con-
figuration conf 1 = (Mˆ1,S ,H,A1) ∈ Conf(Sys real), there exists a polynomial-
time configuration conf 2 = (Mˆ2,S ,H,A2) ∈ Conf(Sys id) (with the same H)
such that viewconf
1
(H) ≈ viewconf
2
(H).
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For the signature systems presented above, this is even shown with A2 = A1; we
call this strong version computational observational equivalence following [43].
Composition and preservation theorems for reactive simulatability [56, 13, 7, 6,
8] show that it has the properties expected from a refinement notion: First, if we
design a larger system based on a specification of a subsystem, and later plug
the implementation of the subsystem in, the entire implementation of the larger
systems is as secure as its design in the same sense of reactive simulatability.
Secondly, if we prove specific security properties for the specification, they also
hold for the implementation.
Simulatability was first sketched for secure multi-party function evaluation,
i.e., the computation of one output tuple from one tuple containing one secret
input from each participant in [59] and defined (with different degrees of gen-
erality and rigorosity) in [39, 21, 50, 25]. Problems such as the separation of
users and adversaries, or defining runtime restrictions in the face of continuous
external inputs, do not occur in this case. The idea of simulatability was sub-
sequently also used for specific reactive problems, e.g., [36, 24, 28], without a
detailed or general definition. In a similar way it was used for the construction
of generic solutions for large classes of reactive problems [38, 37, 41] (usually
yielding inefficient solutions and assuming that all parties take part in all subpro-
tocols). Computational observational equivalence was introduced in [43]. The
first general reactive definition of simulatability was proposed (after some ear-
lier sketches, in particular in [38, 54, 25]) in [55] for a synchronous version of
our underlying general reactive model. The definition was extended to asyn-
chronous scenarios in [56, 26].
5.4 Simulatability Proof
We claim that the low-level real signature machines for a set of users are as
secure as the corresponding low-level ideal system if the underlying signature
scheme is secure.2 More precisely, our sets Sigreal,n,s and {Siglow id,n,s}, to-
gether with the set of all free ports, are each the only structure of a system. We
identify Sigreal,n,s and Siglow id,n,s with these systems and write the simulatabil-
ity claim as follows.
Theorem 3 (Security of the Low-level Real Signature System). Given a se-
cure signature scheme according to Definition 2, we have for all n ∈ N and
2 We defined both these systems for counter-based signature schemes, and Theorem 1 implies
that any CMA-secure counter-based signature scheme is already reactively secure. Both sys-
tems and the proof can easily be generalized to CMA-secure signature schemes with arbitrary
memory. However, then even the ideal system suffers from the problems mentioned in the
introduction.
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s ∈ N[x]:
Sigreal,n,s ≥ Siglow id,n,s.
This holds even in the strong sense of computational observational equivalence.
Proof. We show that for an arbitrary polynomial-time overall user machine in-
teracting with either of our systems, the views are indistinguishable. (As an
adversary has no special ports here, we need not distinguish users and adver-
saries.) The proof is in principle an induction over the number of inputs so far,
showing equality of the views except in one case, followed by a reduction proof
that this case is rare.
The proof uses and shows the following invariant: at all times and for every
u ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the array KEYSu of a real machine Sigu,s can be derived from
KEYS of the ideal machine by restricting KEYS to tuples with user = u and
then deleting the attribute user . All tuples in KEYS are covered in this way.
We now consider the three acceptable inputs at a port insig,u?.
– On input (generate), both machines generate a key pair and output pk in the
same way. The way they store the keys in KEYSu and KEYS retains the
invariant.
– On input (sign, pk ,m), both machines first look for an appropriate secret
key. By the invariant, Sigu,s finds exactly one tuple (sk , pk , c) ∈ KEYSu if
and only if Siglow id,n,s finds exactly one tuple (u, sk , pk , c) ∈ KEYS and
the tuples then have the same sk and c. Both output ↓ if none or more than
one tuple is found, or if c = s(k). Else both increment the counter c, thus
retaining the invariant. Then both output a signature sig generated in the
same way. Only Siglow id,n,s additionally stores (pk ,m) in SIGNED .
– On input (test, pk ,m, sig) and if pk does not exist exactly once in KEYS ,
both machines simply test the signature. Else both machines also output true
only if the signature passes the cryptographic test, but Siglow id,n,s addition-
ally requires that (pk ,m) occurs in SIGNED . However, this sole difference
in the views corresponds to signature forgery and has therefore negligible
probability.
In more detail, the last step is proved in the following standard way: Let
a probabilistic polynomial-time user machine H obtain distinguishable views
when interacting with the two systems. By our considerations of all possi-
ble inputs, H achieves at least one different signature test output (in a run of
the configuration) with not negligible probability (over the possible runs). Let
max keys be a polynomial bounding the number of inputs (generate) made by
H. We construct an adversary Asig against the signature oracle Sigs: It chooses
i R← {1, . . . ,max keys(k)} and starts simulating H and all machines Sigu,s
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and Siglow id,n,s, using the same keys and signatures in both scenarios. When
H makes the i-th input (generate), then Asig uses the key pk from the signature
oracle instead of generating a key pair. The element sk in the resulting tuple
(u, sk , pk , 0) ∈ KEYS is set to ↓, and similarly in KEYSu. From then on,
Asig uses the signature oracle when signing with respect to this key tuple. Thus
for each message m signed by the oracle there is a pair (pk ,m) in the array
SIGNED . Hence when H makes an input (test, pk ,m′, sig ′) where sig ′ is valid
but (pk ,m′) 6∈ SIGNED , then Asig can output (m′, sig ′) as a successful forgery
in the sense of Definition 2. As the simulation is perfect, this happens with not
negligible probability. This contradicts the signature security. Hence the views
of H in the two systems are indeed indistinguishable.
6 Variants of the Low-level Ideal System
We now describe some possible variants of the low-level ideal system.
Memory-less version. If we only want to consider memoryless signatures, we
can omit the parameter s and the counters from Definitions 6 and 7 and the
proof. This is simple text extraction.
Fixed-length schemes. In reactive scenarios where surrounding protocols may
employ encryption, length information about encrypted messages may leak. To
make this manageable for encrypted message parts like signatures and public
keys, it is useful to assume that for given parameters k and s, the length of
signatures and public keys is fixed. This can be modeled by length functions
sig len(k, s) and pks len(k) for the underlying signature scheme as in [14].
Polynomial time. The machines described are only weakly polynomial-time, i.e.,
polynomial-time in the overall length of inputs they received, and not strictly
polynomial-time, i.e., in the security parameter k alone. In their typical intended
application this does not matter. However, all machines can be made strictly
polynomial-time by equipping them with (arbitrary polynomial-time) bounds
on the length and number of accepted inputs at each port.
Scheduling. As the systems are currently described, both in- and outputs would
be scheduled by the users. Instead, one can give the machines clock ports where
they immediately schedule each of their outputs. This is advantageous to keep
the state space small in higher-level proofs if signature-related operations are
only used as local subroutines. If the systems were to be used remotely and in a
larger scenario where users and adversaries have to be distinguished again, one
could also take all the clock ports out of the set S of ports for the users.
Joint semi-real machine. If one intends to use a low-level idealization only once
for proving a completely real implementation of a larger system with respect
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to a higher-level idealization as in [14], it may be simpler for the overall proof
to also write the low-level real system as one machine, because the fact that
the overall real system can be rewritten with such a low-level system implies
that the latter is real enough for the given purpose. We call this a semi-real
system. This would correspond more closely to the treatment of encryption in
[14]. Conversely, that encryption functionality could be rewritten from a semi-
real version (one machine) to a real version if one omits the global key counter
from the low-level ideal version.
7 Conclusion
We have considered signature schemes in a reactive scenario. Our first obser-
vation was that in many protocols, not all signatures become known to the ad-
versary, and a usual assumption in protocol design is that an adversary cannot
forge signatures that have been made but not revealed to him. We called se-
curity for this scenario “reactive security” and explored its relation to normal
security against chosen-message attacks. It turned out that while general signa-
ture schemes can be insecure reactively, schemes whose memory (besides a key
pair) is at most a counter are always reactively secure. For memory-less schemes
this holds with almost unchanged concrete security, while for the general case
with counters, we either lose a factor of s, the maximum number of signatures,
in the success probability of an adversary in the reduction proof, or we have to
additionally randomize the signature scheme.
We further introduced an idealization of signature schemes in the sense of
reactive simulatability, which, at a low level of abstraction, makes the func-
tionality of signature schemes usable in frameworks offering composition and
property preservation theorems. In contrast to prior low-level idealizations, ours
retains the property that the adversary cannot learn signatures that are not ex-
plicitly revealed to him from an underlying counter-based signature scheme.
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